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Regulatory agencies may, whether outside of set rules or within their discretion, depart
from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules, which we term selective
enforcement. Taking China, a country in transition, as an example, and using cases and
large-sample tests, we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement. The results
show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) takes into account whether
companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that
background when investigating and punishing non-compliance. After controlling for the
degree of violation, state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) are punished less severely than private
companies; and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question, the less severe the punish-
ment. It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished. We also ﬁnd that companies that violate
the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for reﬁnancing than those that vio-
late the rules more seriously. This may be because the severity of the violation can affect
listed companies’ expectations of obtaining reﬁnancing. The analysis and conclusions of
this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforce-
ment in transition economies.
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Selective enforcement occurs when law enforcers derail the course of regulation or deviate from the established objective
or principle of regulation and instead execute the law and enforce regulations by discretion. An example is law enforcers
selecting the rules that they enforce according to their own preference, rather than the law. Further, as laws and regulations
have gray areas that are not deﬁned clearly or are discretionary, law enforcers may abuse their power or fail to do their duty
by deliberately making unjust decisions, rather than making judgments based on the principles of justice and reason.1 They
may also deal with some issues but turn a blind eye to others, deal with matters ahead of time or postpone others, and treat the
same kinds of issues with different attitudes.
This study examines the selective enforcement of regulations for the following reasons. First, the quality of law
enforcement has become a very important ﬁeld of study. The role of the law in economic development has been repeat-
edly stated, yet the law was excluded from the framework of economic analysis for a long time and regarded as a ﬁxed
exogenous variable. Researchers started to test the role of the law in the process of economic development empirically
in the 1960s. Since La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) linked the law and the ﬁnancial markets with economic development,
economists have paid greater attention to the role of law in capital markets. Beck et al. (2005) found that the efﬁciency
of the legal system could inﬂuence the sources of economic development, such as industry growth, capital allocation
efﬁciency and corporate ﬁnancing from outside markets. However, the effects may not be the same in a transitional
economy transplanting a development model rooted in developed economies. One important reason for this is that
the enforcement of the law cannot be achieved in a short period of time. Pistor et al. (2000) found that the key factor
restricting the development of ﬁnancial markets is poor law enforcement. In transitional countries, it is thus more
important to improve the quality of law enforcement than to complete the legal system. Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2009) point out that a good legal system that cannot be enforced is no better than having no system of law at all. That
is to say, failure to abide by the law is equal to no law. One of the most important reasons is that selective enforcement
results in unfairness and harms economic efﬁciency. Selective enforcement of the law is an important determinant of the
quality and consequences of law enforcement and the relationship between the economy and the law, and thus merits
theoretical and empirical analysis.
Second, the quality of regulatory enforcement in transitional and emerging economies deserves academic attention, as
regulations play a more important role in these countries because the legal system is not perfect (Glaeser and Shleifer,
2001). Coase (1988) suggested that government regulation may improve economic efﬁciency under some conditions. Pis-
tor and Xu (2003) stated that it is the reallocation of residual legislative power and law enforcement power, rather than
the development of a perfect legal system, that improves the efﬁciency of law enforcement, because when the law is
incomplete it does not clearly set out all potential encroachments. In countries in which the law is imperfect, allocating
legislative power to a regulatory organization that positively enforces the law may be better than allocating that power
to courts that passively enforce the law. This is especially so in transitional countries in which law enforcement is usu-
ally based on administrative regulations rather than the legal system (Pistor and Xu, 2005). The Chinese economy was
originally a planned economy and the inﬂuence of the planned economy has never completely disappeared. Hence, it
will require much effort to perfect the legal system and government regulation is likely to prevail for some time. The
Chinese economy is thus perhaps the best setting for testing the aforementioned theories about the role of selective
enforcement. Chen et al. (2008) found that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) allocated resources based
on hidden contracts. Jiang et al. (2009) used the split share structure reform to investigate the inﬂuence of information
costs on the efﬁciency of government regulations and found that the enforcement of government regulations could be
effective when information costs are low. Besides constraints such as public objections and information costs, a differ-
ence in motivation between the administration and the public may inﬂuence regulation enforcement and may encourage
selective enforcement. Researching the relationship between selective enforcement and economic development is thus
important in transitional and emerging economies. As the largest emerging economy in the world, China provides an
excellent laboratory to examine this problem.
Third, the selective enforcement of regulations may be the norm rather than the exception, especially in China. If this is
the case, then the importance of research on selective enforcement is even greater. For example, the idea that a prince
who violates the law must be punished the same way as an ordinary person was a dream that many intellectuals expected
the law and law enforcement to realize. However, in reality, it is an unattainable ideal. According to Mencius, ‘‘when the
prince regards his ministers as his hands and feet, his ministers regard their prince as their belly and heart; when he re-
gards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as another man; when he regards them as the ground or as grass, they
regard him as a robber and an enemy.’’ However, these words were deleted from the book of Mencius compiled by the
Ming Dynasty founder Zhu Yuanzhang, according to whom the real rules of the game were that if ‘‘a person stole a hook,
he could be punished, while a person usurping a throne became governor,’’ or that ‘‘punishment cannot be brought to bear1 The translation is either ‘‘enforcement’’ or ‘‘implementation.’’ The former stresses initiative and intention, whereas the latter emphasizes extent. In the past,
research has translated the word as ‘‘implementation’’ in English, but in this study we use the word ‘‘enforcement.’’ This is partly because intention inﬂuences
extent, and partly because in this way the study will correspond more closely to the literature in Chinese. There are three levels from which to study
enforcement: the enforcement of laws, the enforcement of rules, and the enforcement of individual contracts. This study mainly studies the enforcement of law
and enforcement of rules, and ‘‘enforcement’’ refers to these two kinds unless stated otherwise. Similarly, the term ‘‘regulation’’ includes both laws and rules.
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equal before the law into practice.3 This study takes the current situation in China as an example to study the selective
enforcement of regulations.
Finally, studying the selective enforcement of regulations in transitional and emerging economies has far-reaching impli-
cations for accounting research. Developed market economies generally follow the ‘‘small government, large government’’
principle, and thus accounting research related to regulations focuses on the political cost of accounting information (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986). However, in transitional and emerging economies, the scope of regulation is larger and the power of
ofﬁcials is stronger, and thus the power of regulation matches and may occasionally surpass the power of the market. The
role of accounting information in regulation needs to be researched more deeply, rather than relying on existing research
based on developed economies. For example, the inﬂuence of selective enforcement on accounting information is a ﬁeld that
merits further study. The market is a client and accounting information must both meet its requirements and adhere to the
regulations. Like the market, regulatory ofﬁcials control many resources and formulate rules to allocate these resources. Re-
search on accounting information in response to regulations in transitional and emerging economies is scarce, but if we do
not explore this problem, then it will be difﬁcult for us to understand the reasons for and effects of accounting information in
transitional and emerging economies.
Motivated by these four reasons, this study uses listed companies punished by the CSRC for illegal corporate actions as
the research sample to observe, analyze and test the empirical existence and consequences of selective enforcement.4 Note
that we use the term ‘‘selective enforcement’’ rather than ‘‘discriminatory enforcement’’ or ‘‘ﬂexible enforcement,’’ in accor-
dance with the literature (Smith and Visher, 1981), and because discriminatory enforcement is negative and ﬂexible enforce-
ment positive, whereas selective enforcement is neutral and corresponds better to the idea of value-neutral empirical
research.2. Literature review, theoretical analysis and background
2.1. Causes of selective enforcement
Generally speaking, the legislation and enforcement process itself is the main cause of selective enforcement.5 From the
legislative point of view, LLSV (1998) found that laws, rules and enforcement vary widely across different countries and legal
systems, and that legal rules in emerging markets are usually less strict. Allen et al. (2005) held that legal systems in emerging
markets (such as China), including those that cover investor protection, corporate governance and government quality, are not
well developed.
The accurate enforcement of the law is becoming objectively harder as social and economic activity ﬂourishes. Pistor and
Xu (2003) held that because of the high cost of information, it is impossible to regulate every tiny aspect of behavior that is
potentially harmful, which inevitably means that there will be gaps in the legislation (and the law cannot deal with certain
harmful behavior). In other words, legal provisions are open, which means that there is no clear deﬁnition that limits the
margins of the law. The law fails to make detailed regulations on certain violations due to its own imperfection, and this large
discretionary space provides an incentive for selective enforcement.6
The scale of authority and cost-beneﬁt principle of enforcement subjectively affect the quality of law enforcement.
Information asymmetry and imperfect contracts mean that enforcement can lack authority and is consequently affected
by different interest groups. Zingales (2009) held that regulations (enforcement) are affected by several factors, such as
the risk of market failure, system control risks and ﬁnancial crises. Hutchinson and Kennedy (2008) used state-level pun-
ishment for pollution as an example and found that the federal government used stricter standards toward companies2 In the Chinese classical book Journey to The West, only one of 18 monsters who have a patron ﬁnally dies: the other 17 are recalled by their patron. In
contrast, of the 26 monsters who have no patron, 20 die. Even the monkey king selectively enforces his power.
3 An example is when Cao Cao held the post of a local ofﬁcial and passed down the death sentence to the uncle of a eunuch favored by the then emperor. This
case has become legendary.
4 Selective enforcement is practiced by the CSRC in their decisions to seriously punish or downplay the illegal action of listed companies. The issue is between
punishing and not punishing, rather than in the degree of punishment. Many violations are solved in private. Although we intended to collect data on
corporations that engaged in illegal actions but were not punished by the CSRC through an Internet search and disclosures in the media, we were unable to
collect a complete sample that ﬁt our criteria. Thus, selective enforcement in this study refers to whether or not the punishment that the CSRC meted out using
its own discretionary power matched the illegal activities in character, execution and damage to investors, and the sample includes only corporations that
engaged in illegal action and were punished.
5 Selective implementation is widespread. Caretto (2005) found that the selectivity of legal proceedings is unavoidable given the limitations on time and
resources, and that law enforcement agencies give up on some cases. An example is a 2008 sex photo incident in China. Members of the public circulate obscene
and indecent articles on the Internet every day and the police do not enforce the law, yet when popular artists were suspected of generating indecent images,
the police arrested a number of people.
6 Selective enforcement is related to but distinct from the concept of random execution. Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) suggested that not all violators are
punished due to the high cost of law enforcement. Enforcement costs (such as those arising from the process of investigating violations and collecting evidence,
arrest, prosecution, and punishment) mean that the probability of being punished for non-compliance follows a certain randomness, that is, the randomness of
alleged execution. Selective enforcement and random penalties are similar in some ways, but there are also differences between them. The level of penalty for
violations may be different in the two cases. Further, selective law enforcement emphasizes a subjective view and is often systemic, such as the CRSC
systematically giving SOEs lighter penalties, whereas the results of random law enforcement are random, and there is no subjective choice.
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cost of regulation enforcement affects the enforcement of political promises by the CSRC. Cost-beneﬁt-based selective
enforcement exists even in sectors such as trafﬁc regulation and immigration regulation in countries or areas with rela-
tively perfect legal systems.7 For example, Smith and Visher (1981) found that policemen enforcing trafﬁc regulations take
both legal and non-legal factors into account, such as gender, profession and race. Bond and Chen (1987) found that not all
illegal immigration is forbidden and that governments permit some illegal immigration after weighing up the economic ben-
eﬁts and costs.
2.2. Effects of selective enforcement on economic and ﬁnancial development
LLSV (1998) found that the legal system of a country is related to its institutions, ﬁnance and economic output. Compared
with countries with civil law systems, countries applying the British legal system better protect investors and creditors, and
also have better institutions, less corruption and more effective courts. In addition, a better system of legal protection and
institutions results in better developed ﬁnancial systems. Allen et al. (2005) found that countries with weaker protection of
small shareholders and outsider investors have weaker ﬁnancial markets, accompanied by slow growth or even a decline in
corporate performance.
It would thus appear that selective enforcement has a large inﬂuence on ﬁnancial markets. However, LLSV (1998) sug-
gests that powerful enforcement can make up for weak legal regulations. In countries with imperfect legal systems or weak
enforcement, selective enforcement can be a substitute mechanism or a supplement. In the existing framework of law and
economics, Ehrlich and Posner (1974) and Rubin (1977) focused on the efﬁciency of law enforcement, and Stigler (1970) and
Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992, 1993) discussed optimal enforcement. Other scholars have studied topics such as personal
enforcement, public enforcement and the costs and beneﬁts of enforcement (Lands and Posner, 1975; Shavell, 1993; Polinsky
and Shavell, 2000).
2.3. Selective enforcement of regulations in China
As stated, although there are many studies on the relationships among law, economics and ﬁnance, and the impact of
selective enforcement has also been studied to some extent, research on the relationship between law and economics in
countries with a weak legal environment and selective enforcement, and the impact of the selective allocation of re-
sources, is still relatively rare.8 The design of the regulatory system for the Chinese capital market, especially in terms
of penalties for non-complying companies, provides a very good experimental environment for empirical research for sev-
eral reasons.
First, the power of the regulatory agencies to punish is less direct. As the stock market regulator, the CSRC has established
the Administrative Punishment Committee and other departments that investigate securities violations. However, these
have relatively limited powers of punishment compared with the regulatory authorities in developed countries (such as
the US Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC),9 and punishments cannot be directly implemented for separate penalty
violations. The effectiveness of the CSRC’s limited battery of disciplinary measures to prevent further violations by listed com-
panies is not obvious (Luo, 2005). The CSRC certainly lacks effectiveness in implementing the rules and its reputation for strict
implementation is thereby affected. When securities regulatory authorities cannot maintain their authority and efﬁciency of
punishment, selective enforcement may occur.
Second, the power source and administrative arrangements of the CSRC mean that it lacks independence. In determining
the allocation of resources to the stock market, and in the investigation and handling of violations, the CSRC is inﬂuenced by
its parent body, which is the State Council at the ministerial level. Further, in addition to the CSRC, the Ministry of Finance
also has the power to punish non-complying companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and the right
to investigate internal issues, which may reduce the independence of the CSRC. In investigating irregularities in a company,
whether the CSRC can remain neutral and give fair and objective treatment is open to question. In addition, the rules do not
easily lead to more stringent selective implementation. For example, an important basis for enforcement by the CSRC is the
‘‘Company Law,’’ which provides that if the information disclosed by a listed company is false and misleading, then the7 Other examples are the ﬁght against idle money by the Hong Kong government during the ﬁnancial crisis, and stricter enforcement during the election
season in the United States, which are both forms of selective enforcement.
8 Jayakar (2003) found that the major developing countries have promulgated certain acts on the protection of intellectual property rights, but that the
enforcement authorities tend to better protect industries that are state related.
9 Harvey et al. (1993) held that the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act 1990 granted more rights to the SEC that not only allow it
to hand out ﬁnes and special bail outs via the federal government, but also to enforce the payment of ﬁnes and directly make Cease-and-Desist Orders for
existing and potential violations. Moreover, the act grants the SEC the right to impose civil sanctions through an administrative process. Before that, the
enforcement rights of the SEC, which were conducted via the courts, were conﬁned to issuing cease-and-correct orders for violations, rather than punishment.
Mclucas found that after the Enron scandal, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 further broadened the enforcement rights of the SEC, granting it powers to expropriate
the illegal earnings of CEOs and CFOs.
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SFC can also choose between several penalties and ﬁnes for the same violation. Nourayi (1994) examined the effectiveness of
enforcement in the United States and found that the reaction of securities prices to violations is directly related to the severity of
the punishment meted out by the SEC. Meng et al. noted that violations make investors lose conﬁdence in a company, and that
punishment for violations makes stock prices fall sharply. The China Journal (2002) studied fraud and public punishment by the
CSRC from 1999 to 2000 and found that the punishments meted out to fraudulently listed companies and their executives were
small compared with the amounts involved in the fraud, and that this raises questions about the fairness of such punishments.
The CSRC is likely to adopt a different strength of enforcement under different market conditions, such as state-owned enter-
prise (SOE) ﬁnancing, restructuring projects and stock market ﬂuctuations, as these affect the stability of the national economy
and a larger number of investors, thereby inﬂuencing social stability. Dai found through case studies that the processing speed
and size of punishment handed out by the SFC differed at different times and for different cases.
Third, the tradeoff between costs and beneﬁts must be considered. On the one hand, punishments given to SOEs may af-
fect the vested interest of the local government. In China, securities businesses are generally stripped down versions of SOEs
or have priority state ﬁnancing (Luo, 2005; Zhu et al., 2006). As enterprises that are owned by the government and the peo-
ple, it is difﬁcult for the CSRC to supervise SOEs. This crude connection may have the effect of ‘‘squeezing out’’ the supervi-
sory rule of the CSRC, andmeans that SOEs may not be punished for their violations. At the same time, obtaining qualiﬁcation
for listing, as a rare ‘‘shell resource,’’ is costly. The ﬁnancing of an SOE may require the cooperation of local government and
the enterprise to obtain listing (Shan, 2002; Yang, 2004). If the company then gets out of line, the CSRCmay not apply the law
strictly to avoid colliding with the government’s goals.
On the other hand, the cost of investigating and punishing a company that fails to comply may be high. The super-
visory institutions need to trade off cost and income in developing punishment policies, and need to pin down the goal
of the punishment. Given the cost of executing the law, it is not optimal to seek to eliminate every violation. Instead, the
supervisory bodies need to make use of their limited resources correctly and strive to achieve the overall goal at a min-
imal cost. The supervisory institutions and SOEs are also kept in close contact due to the personnel ﬂow between them.
Under the dominant pattern of Chinese society and the ‘‘people capital connection’’ (Fei, 1985), supervisory institutions
may have a tendency in dealing with misfeasance by SOEs to take the circumstances into consideration in meting out
punishments.
The local and central government may not be affected when non-SOEs are punished severely, as tax revenue is the only
real bridge that connects the two. However, SOEs may help the local government to achieve many goals beyond tax revenue,
such as employment (Zeng and Chen, 2006) and ofﬁcer promotion (Li and Zhou, 2005). For the central government, the task
of stripping down SOEs requires the punishments handed out to miscreant SOEs to be lenient. The central government does
not require the same for non-SOEs, as they do not signiﬁcantly increase local and central government revenue. Further, as
they are more market-oriented than SOEs, it is difﬁcult for the government to use them to implement their pluralistic goals.
They do not increase revenue, but they do bring higher supervision costs. In supervising SOEs, the CSRC may have the choice
of communication or CEO replacement. In supervising non-SOEs, punishment may be the only approach. If the only punish-
ment approach is selectively gentle, then other non-SOEs may disobey rules and laws much more once they observe the sig-
nal. This will then increase the CSRC’s investigation and punishment costs. The CSRC is reluctant to let this happen, and thus
under the constraint of costs and revenue, it is more likely to punish non-SOEs.
Lenient punishment of insubordinate SOEs may have three main side effects. The ﬁrst is an efﬁciency cost. For example, a
poorly maintained capital market leads to poor efﬁciency, which in turn damages welfare. The second is an action mecha-
nism correction cost. If the actions of an insubordinate company do not match the accepted punishment, then the predicted
cost of insubordination is diminished, and other companies may imitate such actions. This can bring about an incentive to
disobey. When analyzed from the perspective of cost and revenue, the revenue from disobeying or violation pertains to gov-
ernment, rather than to the company or personnel. Although the cost of disobeying is low for SOEs, their incentive to disobey
is weaker than that of non-SOEs, as the revenue that non-SOEs accrue from disobeying is much greater than that for SOEs.
Although China has introduced taxes, foreign trade initiatives and a number of other ﬁnancial support measures for the
development of the non-public economy, their actual implementation has been less than ideal. Non-state enterprises (such
as private enterprises) are subject to much more stringent ﬁnancing constraints (such as bank loans, allotments, or
issuances) (Sun et al., 2006; Lu et al., 2009), and sometimes resort to illegal means to gain more beneﬁts. Increased demand10 Under the Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, provision No. 193: issuer, listed companies or other entities obliged to disclose information that
fail to disclose information or disclose false records and misleading statements, or make major omissions will be ordered to make corrections, given a warning,
and handed out a ﬁne of more than 300,000 yuan but less than 600,000 yuan. The personnel directly in charge and others directly responsible are given a
warning and a ﬁne of more than 30,000 yuan but less than 300,000 yuan. The issuer, listed companies, and other entities obliged to disclose information that
fail to submit a report or submit reports containing false records, misleading statements, or material omissions will be ordered to make corrections, and given a
warning and a ﬁne of more than 300,000 yuan but less than 600,000 yuan. Again, the personnel directly in charge and others directly responsible are given a
warning and a ﬁne of more than 30,000 yuan but less than 300,000 yuan. Under Provision No. 194, the issuer and listed companies changing the use of publicly
raised funds without permission shall be ordered to make corrections, and the personnel directly in charge and others directly responsible given a warning and
a ﬁne of more than 30,000 yuan but less than 300,000 yuan. The issuer, the listed company’s controlling shareholders, and actual controllers shall be given a
warning and a ﬁne of more than 300,000 yuan but less than 600,000 yuan. Under provision No. 203, behavior including the violation of this Law and stock
market manipulation will be dealt with by the seizing of illegally held securities, the expropriation of illegal income, and the imposition of a ﬁne not less than
ﬁve times the illegal income or of more than 300,000 yuan but less than 3,000,000 if the illegal income is less than 300,000 yuan. The personnel directly in
charge and others directly responsible shall be given a warning and a ﬁne of more than 100,000 yuan but less than 600,000 yuan.
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system of restrictions. Weak law enforcement inevitably leads to bad behavior by companies, and the resulting cost to
correct the market cannot be ignored. Selective enforcement allows market players to choose relationships of trust, rather
than relying on the law enforcement body (Luo, 2005). In a sense, the nature of violations by different companies and the
attendant punishments should not be treated as purely legal or technical problems, but should be regarded as a political
issue. In fact, the CSRC’s ‘‘campaign-style’’ of law enforcement for violating companies is difﬁcult to avoid in China and is
closely related to China’s current political system. Bribery is also an issue. The regulatory agencies have great discretion over
non-complying companies (especially private enterprises) and thus to reduce possible sanctions, bribes may be paid to such
agencies with the resources used costed into the transaction.
If the CSRC does engage in selective enforcement, then it should be possible to identify some of the economic conse-
quences. The CSRC is limited in its power to directly punish violations, but it can directly affect the allocation of resources,
and in this way replaces market power. The framework for the CSRC gives it the right to approve reﬁnancing, and thus a vio-
lating company may in the future be at a disadvantage in terms of reﬁnancing quotas (Jiang et al., 2009). At the same time,
the poor level of resource allocation also affects the CSRC (Chen et al., 2008). Serious violations generally have a greater social
impact and investors also need to take on more risk when a company’s credibility is seriously damaged. In assessing appli-
cations for reﬁnancing from non-compliant companies, the CSRC is likely to consider the seriousness of the violation, and
companies whose violations are more minor may be more likely to be successful. Companies that have engaged in serious
violations may thus expect to be rejected, and are less likely to apply.
Based on the foregoing theoretical and institutional background analysis, we predict that in punishing, the CSRC takes
into account the nature of a company’s violations, that SOEs suffer lighter punishments and that the higher the level of state
involvement, the more severe the penalty. In making decisions about punishment, the CSRC considers several factors. The
ﬁrst is investor losses: the CSRC decides on the punishment by observing the market reaction to the losses that a company’s
non-compliance has created for investors and practices a form of ‘‘calm man’s angry,’’ where the greater the loss, the greater
the possibility of being subject to heavy penalties. The second consideration is sector, with protected industries being less
likely to receive heavy penalties for violations. The third is the stock market environment: during stock market downturns,
the CSRC will hand out fewer heavy penalties for fear of damaging market conﬁdence, but in a more buoyant securities mar-
ket may choose to increase the intensity of punishments to avoid market speculation. The fourth is the level of violation, with
serious breaches being more likely to be heavily punished. The ﬁnal consideration is the law enforcement environment. In
2001, the National People’s Congress audited the CSRC’s enforcement and found it to be lax, since which time the CSRC has
made efforts to strengthen its law enforcement and is more likely to heavily punish violating companies. To test these pre-
dictions, this study provides two descriptive cases and large sample empirical tests.3. Case-based evidence
3.1. The Kaili case
The CSRC is deﬁned as an administrative institution, but this deﬁnition is inconsistent with its nature and its legal status.
According to the Securities Act, ‘‘it has the equivalent authority of the state council administrative authority.’’ The CSRC has a
high status and independent enforcement power. However, its legal status is not consistent with the nature of its business
and its responsibilities do not stand up to close scrutiny from the legal perspective, which may affect its authority over the
securities market. The Hainan Kaili case is an example of a direct challenge by a private enterprise to the right of the CSRC to
enforce the law. On July 5, 2001, in the Beijing Municipal Higher People’s Court, in a landmark case in the Chinese stock mar-
ket the administrative tribunal Vice-President gave an order to ‘‘appeal and maintain the verdict,’’ thus marking the failure of
the CSRC (Li, 2001).
Kaili was established from Six Enterprises Co. Ltd. in December 1994. The company’s goal was to build the central line of
the Hainan Expressway, a planned road running from Haikou to Tongshi with a length of 172 km. The project required dy-
namic investment of about 54 billion yuan, and thus ﬁnancing became the company’s core work after its establishment. In
March 1997, the Hainan Securities Management Ofﬁce sent a letter to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission recommending
Kaili’s public offering on the stock market. In February 1998, the CSRC notiﬁed the Securities Management Ofﬁce that they
had agreed to accept Kaili’s application materials for stock issuance, and required the inclusion of this in the Province Plan for
1997. In June 1998, Kaili submitted its application materials for A-share issuance to the CSRC. In June 1999, Kaili received a
report from the CSRC transferred from the relevant State Council departments (China Securities Regulatory Commission
(1999), No. 39). According to the report, 97% of Kaili’s proﬁts did not exist, which was a serious violation of the Company
Law, and thus the company did not meet the standard for initial public offering (IPO). The CSRC decided to rescind its ap-
proval for IPO. The application materials submitted more than a year previously were eventually returned by the CSRC. Kaili
sued the CSRC.
On December 18, 2000, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court made the following ﬁrst-instance ruling: (1) the
defendant (CSRC), in returning the company’s materials, had broken the law; (2) the defendant was ordered to reissue its
authorization for Kaili’s application for IPO, and to make a decision within two months of the judgment; (3) Kaili’s other
claims were dismissed. In the second instance, the CSRC strongly emphasized their legal status. The CSRC agent reviewed
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the material submitted by Kaili was in the ‘‘pre-selection’’ stage. The pre-selection process is a historical issue. In 1998, the
State Council authorized the CSRC to examine stock issuance, which was a compulsory approval process under the planned
economic system. To facilitate communication with local governments and enterprises, the CSRC developed rules for the pre-
selection process that were compatible with the mandatory plan. After the promulgation of the ‘‘Securities Act,’’ the CSRC
issued stock issuance procedures in 2000 and abandoned the quota and limit system. The essential difference between
the 2000 and 1998 review procedure was that the former aimed to give guidance for listing by underwriters, whereas the
latter provided guidance for local governments or ministries on recommending companies for listing. Although a new ap-
proval process for stock issuance was generated, it arrived after the Kaili case. According to the CSRC, Kaili’s application
for listing was historical, and was not subject to the approval process developed in 2000. Hence, the CSRC could not enforce
the judgment in the ﬁrst-instance verdict and was unable to restore Kaili’s listing application according to the procedures
approved in 2000.
Lawyers from the Beijing Zhongzhao law ofﬁce, Kaili’s agents, submitted that neither the ‘‘Provisional Regulations on
Stock Issuance and Transaction Management’’ nor the ‘‘Securities Act’’ provide for pre-selection procedures. The pre-selec-
tion process developed by the CSRC was beyond its mandate, and the CSRC had formulated its own rules of conduct, which
was not appropriate: such rules should be developed by higher authorities or legislative bodies. In addition, the CSRC inter-
pretation of the 2000 approval process was wrong. The 2000 approval process made it clear how historical problems were to
be solved, and companies making applications in 1997 were placed under the procedural changes approved in 2000. Kaili
asked the court to conﬁrm that the CSRC’s returning of the pre-selection materials to Kaili was illegal, and to order the CSRC
to restore Kaili’s listing application according to the procedures approved in 2000. On July 5, 2001, the Beijing Higher Peo-
ple’s Court made the ﬁnal judgment on the case, ordering the CSRC to restore Kaili’s listing application and to make an
administrative decision on approval within two months of the re-initiation of the process.
The ‘‘pre-selection procedure’’ was one of the most important disputes in the Kaili case. The procedure involves ﬁrst being
recommended by the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly to the central government or ministry, and then
being reviewed by the CSRC. The procedure includes reporting pre-qualiﬁcation material; veriﬁcation; a formal recommen-
dation, approval, review, and other procedures; and the formal declaration of application materials. The procedure is rather
complicated. The judge asked the CSRC, ‘‘in the State Council promulgated the ‘‘Provisional Regulations on Stock Issuance
and Transaction Management’’ (collectively known as the ‘‘Ordinance’’) No. 12 on the application processing procedures
for the public offering of shares, is there a pre-selection process?’’ The CSRC answered ‘‘no.’’ There is also no article in the
Company Law regarding a pre-selection procedure. The CSRC takes several years to execute the pre-selection procedure,
but there appears to be no legislative basis for this. Securities regulators need to regulate the market behavior of listed com-
panies and investors, but must also regulate themselves, but who will supervise and inspect the enforcement powers of the
CSRC, which are granted by the State Council?
In 1993, the State Council promulgated the ‘‘Ordinance’’ to regulate the formal declaration and response time for appli-
cations for IPO. The Ordinance contains clear rules: the issuance must occur on a national scale, the local government author-
ities and the central department in charge must examine and approve the issuing application within 30 days of receipt and
must send a copy to the CSRC, and the approved application must be sent to the CSRC for review. The CSRC must generate
guidelines within 20 working days from the date of receipt of the review, and then issue guidelines. Why, then, did Kaili have
to wait more than a year?
Although Kaili had their legal claim satisﬁed, there was great difﬁculty in implementing the judgment. Ultimately, Kaili
was not the winner, as the judgment was not carried out. Kaili was unable to continue with the public review process, and
although in 1999 the State Planning Commission approved Kaili to issue 1 billion yuan of corporate bonds, no broker was
willing to underwrite the company to transfer the stocks to bonds, and Kaili’s ﬁnancing attempt failed. The judgment seemed
unfavorable to the CSRC, but in fact it may actually have improved its social image. Although the judgment terminated many
years of implementation of the ‘‘pre-selection procedure’’ and ‘‘audit procedures,’’ it did not change the logic that allowed the
CSRC to formulate its own rules for listed companies and to decide the fate of their listing applications. Companies and the
CSRC cannot be equal in the main market economy. In transitional economies, the securities regulatory system is usually not
as effective nor as strict as it should be, but still the CSRC should strive to make the securities regulatory systemmore market
friendly. However, under the premise of a poor regulatory environment and lack of effective means of supervision, abandon-
ing the delegation of authority or regulatory power is impractical.
Due to ‘‘indicators’’ and ‘‘quota’’ restrictions, private enterprises often switch to overseas capital markets for ﬁnancing.
Before the main case against the CSRC, Kaili attempted to go public by buying a shell in the United States, because there were
no relevant provisions at that time regarding the issuance of B shares. A Chinese consulting ﬁrm suggested Kaili consider
going public by buying a shell in the NASDAQ system. Kaili accepted the proposal, and in November 1995 the two signed
a ‘‘consulting contract,’’ with the Chinese consulting ﬁrm committing itself to supporting Kaili in its dealings with foreign
investment banks, lawyers and other intermediaries to buy a shell. However, this time Kaili suffered commercial fraud, com-
mitted by the deputy general manager of the Chinese consulting ﬁrm Ren Zhonghua , who undertook the Kaili contract in
person. In 1998,   was promoted to the CSRC as deputy director of the inspection bureau. He was also put in charge of
harmonizing the CRSC’s business relations and was responsible for auditing listed companies. In April 2000, the CSRC judged
Kaili’s reported performance to be false and returned its market material. Kaili reported that there were connections be-
tween the decision of the CSRC and the Chinese consulting ﬁrm, and suspected   to be the key ﬁgure in the matter. In
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year, Kaili submitted the application materials for the issuance of A-shares to the CSRC, and the CSRC investigated the com-
pany twice after receiving the materials. The CSRC is obliged to routinely publicize its review procedures to minimize or
eliminate the possibility of rent-seeking, yet legal standards have been replaced by individual will. Whether CSRC ofﬁcials
are using their power to put up barriers to share issuance applications is unknown.
3.2. The Lukang case
As China’s main securities market regulatory body, the CSRC performs the various functions of supervision, development
of regulations, pre-market approval investigations and punishment. This raises the question of whether, when companies are
suspected of violating the law, the CSRC can investigate in a timely, effective and public fashion. Regulatory policy for the
securities market once emphasized a disequilibrium service, with SOEs mainly relying on government and administrative
authority to enter the capital market to obtain resources. In the new transition economy, the CSRC faces the important prob-
lem of how to give up the role of state ownership. In fact, the CSRC is tainted by its association with state ownership, and
thus whether it can treat enterprises with different ownership types impartially is questionable.
The Shandong Lukang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Lukang’’) was established based on the Shan-
dong State Commission for Economic Restructuring document [1992] No. 142, ‘‘Ofﬁcial Document Regarding the Establish-
ment of the Shandong Lukang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.’’ The Shandong Lu Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. (an antibiotic
manufacturer from Jinan) was ﬁrst established by raising funds from targeted sources. Lukang Pharmaceutical A shares were
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in February 1997. Lukang is now a large ﬁrst-class SOE, and one of the 512 key state
enterprises. On December 11, 2002 Lukang published a letter of intent to issue not more than 4700 million yuan worth of
shares, with subscription to begin on December 17. On December 14, Lukang held a road show in Beijing. However, based on
a report from a Lukang insider to the CSRC citing instances of fraud in its declarations of main business revenue and net proﬁt
in several years of Lukang’s ﬁnancial reports, the CSRC issued an emergency halt to the subscription. The application mate-
rials provided included details of Lukang’s client list and sales to each customer. From January to September 2002, Lukang
accumulated drug sales of 3.58 billion yuan, yet Lukang’s main business income as disclosed in the third quarter of 2002 was
7.8194 billion yuan. The whistleblower reported that to increase the book proﬁt for the three years from 2000 to 2002, Luk-
ang had refused to accrue depreciation expenses of about 300 million yuan. In addition, Lukang had issued a false ﬁnancial
statement for 2001. Lukang reported revenue from main operations of 7.71 billion yuan and a net proﬁt of 70.46 million
yuan. However, the whistleblower stated that Lukang’s real main income in 2001 was only 5 billion yuan, and that it actually
earned either a small proﬁt or even suffered a slight loss. On August 16, 2002, Lukang’s chairman, who doubled as the sec-
retary of the party committee, prepared an internal report entitled ‘‘Overcoming Inertia and Advancing with the Times to
Ensure Lukang Even Greater Prosperity and Development’’ (Pang, 2003). To some extent, the report showed the true state
of operations within the enterprise. The report mentioned that with the continuous adjustment of national policy, Lukang
was facing increasing risk. By the ﬁrst half of 2002, Lukang was running at a loss. Lukang’s ﬁnancial statements reported
a net proﬁt of 5.13 billion yuan in the third quarter of 2002. This study could not obtain access to the speciﬁc content of
the internal report, but if the whistleblower had disclosed a fabricated or inaccurate internal report, then Lukang should have
come out and clariﬁed matters. However, we could ﬁnd no such clariﬁcation after the announcement of fraud hit the news-
papers. If the internal report was true, then Lukang reduced its losses and increased proﬁts by more than 50 million yuan in
three months.
On January 8, 2003, the CSRC agency in Jinan formed an investigation panel composed of four members to investigate
Lukang. However, no timely disclosure of relevant information was made, again revealing the CSRC’s attitude to regulation
of the securities market. As the largest shareholder of Lukang is the Shandong Province SASAC, the CSRC had a duty to inves-
tigate properly, as its remit is to investigate the illegal behavior of listed companies, especially state-owned listed companies
that are directly related to the construction and long-term development of China’s stock market. Close study shows that
although the CSRC sent an investigation team to Lukang, it made no announcement of its ﬁndings. On March 6, 2003, Lukang
clariﬁed that it had learned from the relevant department of the CSRC that material reported by the company in 2001 was
suspected of being fraudulent, and that data reported for the period January to September 2002 lacked sufﬁcient evidence.
However, these ﬁndings should have been issued publicly by the CSRC, not by Lukang. In addition, whether the conclusion of
‘‘insufﬁcient evidence’’ was based on the material reporting the fraud or the conclusions of the investigation of the CSRC
agency is unknown. Regardless of whether the material fraud was true or whether the whistleblower deliberately fabricated
it to create trouble, the CSRC should not have kept silent, and can be accused of a dereliction of duty in not disclosing the
ﬁndings. The whistleblower closely watched the development of the matter, and liaised with the relevant CSRC ofﬁcers
on the day that Lukang released the clariﬁcation. The whistleblower asked for a written reply from the ofﬁcial investigation,
but was refused.
On May 23, 2003, several major newspapers announced that Lukang would restart its share offering, despite being or-
dered to suspend it by the CSRC the previous December. Lukang announced on the date of the original issuance of the A-
shares that the offering was expected to be completed in early June. However, without the approval of the CSRC, Lukang
could not legally restart the offering. Did the CSRC make a deﬁnite conclusion as to whether Lukang was involved in ﬁnancial
fraud? On May 28, 2003, the CSRC issued a ‘‘Refusal to accept document’’ that made it clear that it refused the whistleblower’
challenge to the company’s application for listing due to fraud in 2001 and between January and September 2002. The
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acts on the part of corporations, social organizations and individuals by citizens was beyond the scope of administrative
reconsideration. Note that there are speciﬁc requirements for administrative reconsideration. In accordance with the PRC
Administrative Reconsideration Law Article XVII and CSRC Administrative Reconsideration Act Article XVII, the CSRC de-
clined to reconsider. Lukang successfully restarted its offering, and the CSRC issued a written decision not to accept the appli-
cation for administrative reconsideration from the whistleblower. It is unclear whether this means that Lukang was cleared
of ﬁnancial fraud. On February 10, 2004, the whistleblower again approached the CSRC to report ﬁnancial fraud by Lukang,
stating that important ﬁnancial data had not been reported to the CSRC. There were also several work safety accidents at
Lukang in 2003, but Lukang never ofﬁcially disclosed them. On February 11, 2004, the relevant departments of the CSRC
heard an oral report from the whistleblower, and decided that it would investigate and deal with the matter according to
the law. This was a full six months after Lukang’s successful issuance and the debate over Lukang’s ﬁnancial fraud had appar-
ently been settled. The CSRC may have lacked an incentive to thoroughly investigate Lukang’s ﬁnancial problems. The CSRC
also did not publish the ﬁndings of its investigation of the second whistleblower report.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Sample and data description
This study measures the selective enforcement of the CSRC in two respects: the severity of punishment and the efﬁciency
of punishment. The sample mainly consists of announcements by the CSRC of decisions to punish, augmented by a manual
search for cases of violations. We collected a total of 201 instances of violations that were punished by the CSRC, of which
116 were companies receiving penalties as announced by the CSRC between 2002 and 2008, and the other 85 were compa-
nies committing violations between 1994 and 2001 that were collected manually.11
We use two criteria to classify the severity of the violation. The ﬁrst criterion values severity according to the type of
violation and considers differences in motives and consequences. Violations including the non-disclosure of material
matters, the disclosure of false or seriously misleading statements, price manipulation and insider trading are deﬁned
as more serious violations, for which the corresponding variable OFFEND takes the value of 1, and the remainder are
deﬁned as less serious violations, for which the variable OFFEND equals 0.12 The other criterion values the amount lost
by investors (LOSS). If the losses sustained by investors are above the median, then the corresponding variable LOSS takes
the value of 1, and 0 otherwise.13 To a certain extent, the amount lost by investors is a more objective proxy for the sever-
ity of the violation, but it is very difﬁcult to accurately determine the window of loss and exclude noise arising from other
events. We thus adopt both criteria for a more comprehensive measure. We deﬁne the severity of punishment (PUNISH) as
equaling 0 when the penalty is in the less serious form of public criticism, and 1 when the penalty is in the more serious
form of public punishment.
Table 1 reports the distribution of the different types of violations of the listed companies in the sample. Panel A shows
the severity of violation by type of violation (OFFEND). Of the 201 miscreant companies, 40 (about 70.18%) of the 57 com-
panies committing less serious violations received lighter penalties, and only 17 (about 29.82%) were subject to heavy pen-
alties. Of the 144 companies committing serious violations, 113 (about 78.47%) received heavy penalties and only 31 (about
21.53%) were subject to lighter penalties.14 Panel B shows the severity of violation by the amount lost by investors (LOSS). Of
the 201 violations, 57 of the 98 companies causing less serious losses (about 58.16%) received lighter penalties and 41 (about
41.84%) were subject to heavy penalties. Of the 103 companies causing serious losses, 89 (about 86.41%14) received heavy pen-
alties and only 14 (about 13.59%) were subject to lighter penalties.
Clearly, the severity of punishment meted out by the CSRC is closely related to the severity of violation, with more serious
violations usually being subject to heavy penalties and less serious violations being subject to lighter penalties. The results
are similar for the two classiﬁcations of severity of violations. In terms of the nature of the violating companies, Panel A,11 We mainly reviewed the China Securities News and Shanghai Securities News. The remaining data came from the CCER and Wind databases.
12 The severity of violation is deﬁned as follows. Violation type 1 is a failure to perform other duties according to the law; type 2 is a failure to disclose periodic
reports on time; type 3 is an incorrect performance prediction; type 4 is a failure to disclose material matters on time; type 5 is a disclosure of false information
or seriously misleading statement, changing the use of funds without permission, violation of investment rules, material omission, or the illegal provision of
assurance; and type 6 is price manipulation or insider trading. When the violation is one or a combination of any of types 1, 2, and 3, the violation is deﬁned as
light. When the violation is one or a combination of any of types 4, 5, and 6, then it is deﬁned as serious. The numbers of violation cases corresponding to the six
types of violation are 49, 22, 9, 57, 129, and 5, respectively. For the same level of violation (light or serious), we hold that the violation behavior of SOEs and
non-SOEs is the same. For example, in the group of light violators, the behavior of being late in disclosing an annual report or failing to perform other duties is
the same for SOEs and non-SOEs.
13 Investor losses refer to the rate of loss that violations by listed companies bring to their investors. Basically, there are two ways of estimating investor
losses. One is the incident response method, which calculates the market reaction during the short window around the punishment for violations. This method
has less noise but may omit large quantities of information. The other is the causal law, which calculates the market reaction within a long window from the
start of the violation behavior to the time of punishment. This approach has more noise, but suffers less from the omission of information. To better describe the
impact of violations by listed companies on investors, we adopt the causal law method to calculate investor losses. To reduce the noise to a minimum, we use
the method of deducting the effects of the market system to reduce the impact of systemic factors (Chen et al., 2008). Investor loss (LOSS) is calculated as
follows: (ARi,t = violating company I’s rate of return on day t  the rate of return of the market on day t, T = the day the violation behavior started until one day
before the violation was punished. LOSSi ¼ ð1Þ  CARi;t ¼ 
PT
t¼1ARit .
14 The severity of penalties is deﬁned as light when the punishment is public criticism, and serious when the punishment is a public penalty.
Table 1
Distribution of violating companies and their punishment.
Type Severity of violation Severity of punishment Total
Light Proportion (%) Serious Proportion (%)
Panel A violation = OFFEND
Whole sample Light 40 70.18 17 29.82 57
Serious 31 21.53 113 78.47 144
Nature of company
SOEs Light 28 77.78 8 22.22 36
Serious 24 30.38 55 69.62 79
Non-SOEs Light 12 57.14 9 42.86 21
Serious 7 10.77 58 89.23 65
Panel B violation = LOSS
Whole sample Light 57 58.16 41 41.84 98
Serious 14 13.59 89 86.41 103
Nature of company
SOEs Light 41 69.49 18 30.51 59
Serious 11 19.64 45 80.36 56
Non-SOEs Light 16 41.03 23 58.97 39
Serious 3 6.38 44 93.62 47
Fig. 1. Days escaping penalty.
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heavy penalties, whereas the corresponding ﬁgure for private companies is 42.86%, some 20% higher than that for SOEs. This
indicates that companies with a state-owned background are subject to less severe penalties than companies without this
background. Further, only 69.62% of SOEs committing serious violations received heavy penalties, whereas the ﬁgure for pri-
vate companies is 89.23%, again some 20% higher than that for SOEs. Panel B, which uses the amount lost by investors to
value the severity of violation, provides consistent evidence. Together, these results show that in cases of severe violation,
companies with a state-owned background tend to receive lighter penalties, and that ‘‘princes’’ that break the law do not
receive the same punishment as ‘‘common people.’’ For the same level of violation, the CSRC engages in selective enforce-
ment, under which listed companies with a state-owned background receive lighter penalties than listed companies with
no state-owned background.1515 It is necessary to add that, by the end of 2008, there were 1575 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, of which 953 were SOEs and
622 non-SOEs. The proportion of companies committing violations was 12% (115/953) among SOEs and 14% (86/622) among non-SOEs, indicating that non-
SOEs are more likely to violate the regulations. However, the difference is not very large. Due to the limited sources of information, we cannot observe the exact
number of enterprises committing violations, and what is available is only a sample of companies that were punished for their violations. Companies that
committed violations but were not punished are excluded, and thus the basic level of selective enforcement (to punish or not) is not known. That we can only
test companies that violated the regulations and were punished is a defect of this study. We thus believe that the proportions mentioned in the main text
contain noise and may not accurately measure the general prevalence of violation among SOEs and non-SOEs.
Table 2
Days companies escaped punishment by the CSRC.
Type Severity of violation Sample size Escape days T-stat
Whole sample Light 57 298.46 11.52***
Panel A violation = OFFEND
Whole sample Light 57 298.46 11.52***
Serious 144 1142.85
Nature of company
SOEs Light 36 308.47 6.38***
Serious 79 1169.47
Non-SOEs Light 21 281.29 9.10***
Serious 65 1110.51
Severity of violation Type Sample size Escape days T-stat
Panel B violation = OFFEND
Whole sample SOEs 115 899.94 0.08
Non-SOEs 86 908.02
Light SOEs 36 308.47 0.34
Non-SOEs 21 281.29
Serious SOEs 79 1169.41 0.51
Non-SOEs 65 1110.51
Type Severity of violation Sample size Escape days T-stat
Panel C violation = LOSS
Whole sample Light 98 453.04 10.81***
Serious 103 1331.89
Nature of company
SOEs Light 59 365.03 10.47***
Serious 56 1463.50
Non-SOEs Light 39 586.18 4.58***
Serious 47 1175.09
Severity of violation Type Sample size Escape days T-stat
Panel D violation = LOSS
Whole sample SOEs 115 899.94 0.08
Non-SOEs 86 908.02
Light SOEs 59 365.03 2.30**
Non-SOEs 39 586.18
Serious SOEs 56 1463.50 2.15**
Non-SOEs 47 1175.09
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
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ciency with which the penalties are enforced, or whether companies can ‘‘escape’’ their penalty. The efﬁciency of penalty
enforcement may of course be constrained by the capacity of the regulator.
Fig. 1 shows that the ability of violating companies to escape their penalty varies with time. In the early stages of the
securities market, violators were promptly punished because there were fewer listed companies and thus they were easier
to supervise. As the capital market developed, the number of listed companies grew and economic activities became increas-
ingly complex and diversiﬁed, which made supervision more difﬁcult and allowed companies to ‘‘escape’’ penalties for a cer-
tain period before being punished. Following a National People’s Congress’s review of law enforcement in 2001, the CSRC
signiﬁcantly enhanced its law enforcement efforts, which resulted in a signiﬁcant improvement in enforcement efﬁciency
in 2001 and 2002. However, after 2003, the period for which violators escaped their penalties increased rather than de-
creased. This is probably related to the CSRC’s ‘‘campaign-style’’ law enforcement.
Table 2 lists the distribution of the number of days that different types of companies escaped their penalties.16 Panel A and
Panel B use type of violation to as a proxy for the severity of the violation, and Panel C and Panel D use the amount lost by inves-
tors as a proxy for the severity of the violation.16 ‘‘Escape’’ is deﬁned as the interval from the point at which a listed company initially committed the violation to the day that the violation was punished,
measured in days. A perfect measurement would run from the day the CSRC started to investigate the violation until the day the violation was punished, but the
CSRC Administrative Punishment Committee only partially discloses when the violation behavior of a company was documented. Most publically available
reports use general terms such as ‘‘the recent identiﬁcation of,’’ ‘‘identiﬁed,’’ or ‘‘under investigation.’’ We are thus unable to deduce the exact time at which the
CSRC started its investigation of company violations for the entire sample, and so instead use the aforementioned measure.
Table 3
Distribution of reﬁnancing applications and approvals of violating companies.
Type Severity of violation Number of events Number of companies applying for reﬁnancing Proportion (%)
Panel A violation = OFFEND
Whole sample Light 31 16 51.61
Serious 81 29 35.80
Reﬁnancing
Panel B violation = OFFEND
Companies applying for reﬁnancing Light 16 12 75.00
Serious 29 24 82.76
Number of companies applying for reﬁnancing
Panel C violation = LOSS
Whole sample Light 76 25 32.89
Serious 36 20 55.56
Reﬁnancing
Panel D violation = LOSS
Companies applying for reﬁnancing Light 25 20 80.00
Serious 20 16 75.00
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heavy violators is 1258 days. These statistics indicate that companies committing serious violations had a signiﬁcantly long-
er escape time than companies committing light violations. In terms of the ownership type of the companies, there is a sig-
niﬁcant difference in the escape time of companies committing serious violations and light violations. Among the SOEs, the
average number of escape days of those committing light violations is 438 days, whereas the number for companies com-
mitting heavy violations is 1341 days. In contrast, among the non-SOEs, the average number of escape days of companies
committing light violations is 80 days, whereas the corresponding number for companies committing heavy violations is
1265 days. To further investigate the effects of state ownership on the escape time of violating companies, we also examined
the average escape time of SOEs and non-SOEs. Panel B shows that the average number of escape days of SOEs is 1044 and
that of non-SOEs is 1049 days. The difference between the two numbers is not signiﬁcant. The sub-samples of severity of
violation types show that among the light violators, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the number of escape days between
SOEs and non-SOEs, and the same is true of the sub-sample of serious violators. However, Panel C and Panel D show that
among the sub-sample of light violators, the number of escape days of SOEs is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of non-SOEs,
whereas among the sub-sample of serious violators, the escape time is signiﬁcantly longer among SOEs than among non-
SOEs.
The descriptive statistics show that no uniform and deﬁnite conclusions can be drawn on the relation between the escape
time of a company and whether it has a state-owned background. Of course, this does not take into account the different
degree of supervision and enforcement of the CSRC of violating companies in different periods. After controlling for the var-
iable YEAR, we examine whether SOEs still escape for a longer time than non-SOEs. We also do not take into account the level
of the SOEs in the descriptive statistics, and thus have no idea whether SOEs directly under the central government have a
longer escaped time. This is addressed later in the empirical results.
The economic consequences of the handing out of penalties to listed companies may include an effect on the allocation of
resources in the securities markets, as the CSRC takes into account the ‘‘documented record’’ of violations, including severity
of violation, in assessing the reﬁnancing applications of listed companies.
Table 3 shows data on the reﬁnancing applications of the 112 violating companies that met the reﬁnancing criteria.17 Pan-
els A and B use violation type as a proxy for the severity of the violation and shows that the proportion of companies applying
for reﬁnancing of the 31 light violators and the 81 serious violators is 51.61% and 35.80%, respectively. The proportion of light
violators applying for reﬁnancing is signiﬁcantly higher than that of serious violators. Of the 16 light violators and the 29 serious
violators that applied for reﬁnancing, 12 and 24 obtained a quota, respectively, indicating that companies committing light vio-
lations had a slightly lower success in obtaining a quota than companies committing heavy violations. Panels C and D use the
amount lost by investors as a proxy for the severity of the violation and shows that the proportion of companies applying for
reﬁnancing among the 76 light violators and 36 serious violators is 32.89% and 55.56%, respectively. Of the 25 light violators and17 The overall sample includes two groups of companies: companies that obtained SEOs and companies that met the reﬁnancing conditions. The criteria for
companies meeting the reﬁnancing conditions are rougher, and mainly focus on the proﬁtability requirements, which are continuous proﬁtability for the
previous three years and an average ROE of 10% or more for the previous three years. The number of listed companies applying for reﬁnancing can be gleaned
from announcements at the shareholders’ meetings of listed companies. If a company has re-ﬁnancing needs, then the reﬁnancing proposal must be approved
at the shareholders’ meeting. Our data thus come from materials from shareholders’ meetings available in the ‘‘major issues’’ section of the Sina Finance
website (http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/stock/). Because such information was ﬁrst disclosed in 2000 only, the reﬁnancing sample is conﬁned to companies
committing violations during or after 2000. A total of 112 companies meet the ﬁltering conditions, of which 46 either secured reﬁnancing or had their
reﬁnancing proposal approved at the shareholders’ meeting.
Table 5
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable name Symbol Deﬁnition
Severity of punishment PUNISH Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when companies committing violations are punished, and 0 otherwise
Escape days ESCAPE Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the number of escape days is larger than the median for the
year, and 0 otherwise
Severity of violation OFFEND Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a violation is serious, and 0 otherwise
Investors losses LOSS Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if investor losses are larger than the median, and 0 otherwise
Nature of companies SOE Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the company is state owned, and 0 otherwise
Characteristics of
industry
PROTECT Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the industry is protected, and 0 otherwise
Market environment SOAR Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when punishment occurred in a bull market, and 0 otherwise
Rate of return on net
assets
ROE Rate of return on net assets in the year before the listed company was punished
Asset-liability ratio LEV Asset-liability ratio in the year before the listed company was punished
Company size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets for the year before the listed company was punished
Region REGION Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the company is located in a more developed eastern area, and 0
otherwise
Table 4
Reﬁnancing applications and time taken to secure approval for violating companies.
Time Type of violation Sample size Mean Median T Z
Panel A violation = OFFEND
Reﬁnancing application Light 16 293.75 239.00 4.06*** 2.97***
Serious 29 947.38 801.00
Reﬁnancing approval Light 12 326.50 270.50 3.86*** 2.64***
Serious 24 1050.54 977.00
Panel B violation = LOSS
Reﬁnancing application Light 25 394.24 267.00 3.87*** 15.00***
Serious 20 1115.90 1124.50
Reﬁnancing approval Light 20 445.60 287.00 3.86*** 2.65***
Serious 16 1263.69 1348.50
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
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portion of light violators were successful in obtaining a quota than heavy violators.
The CSRC may be aware that companies that have committed serious violations may selectively avoid applying for reﬁ-
nancing, and because the potential market value for seasoned equity offering (SEO) qualiﬁcation is large, the cost of policy
enforcement is quite high. However, giving companies committing light violations more reﬁnancing opportunities may
undermine the CSRC’s reputation for enforcement. The CSRCmay not take into account the severity of violations when decid-
ing whether to grant a reﬁnancing quota, and may instead classify all tainted companies as having an equally poor credit
record. Moreover, the rights to enforce punishment and issue permissions belong to different departments of the CSRC,
which need to communicate and coordinate.
Table 4 shows the statistics on the time taken to process a reﬁnancing application and receive approval for violating com-
panies.18 Panel A uses violation type as a proxy for the severity of the violation, and shows that the average time taken to secure
approval for the 16 light violators is 293.75 days, whereas the average time for the 29 serious violators is 947.38 days. Compa-
nies committing light violations thus wait for a signiﬁcantly shorter time. In addition, of the 36 companies that obtained a quo-
ta, the severity of violation had a signiﬁcant impact on the time taken to secure approval. Panel B uses the amount lost by
investors and provides similar evidence.
Table 5 lists the deﬁnitions of the main variables used in this study.
Table 6 lists the descriptive statistics for the main variables. It shows that SOEs (SOE) are the majority in the sample,
accounting for 57.21% of the companies. Companies in protected industries (PROTECT) account for only 5.47% of the sample.
Companies that committed violations in a bull market (SOAR) account for 45.77% of the sample. Companies from the eastern
region (REGION) account for 47.76% of the sample.18 The time taken to apply for reﬁnancing is measured as the interval from the day that the company was punished for violation to the day that the proposal
for reﬁnancing was approved at the shareholders’ meetings. Because we cannot determine the time when Xinhuajin (600735) had its reﬁnancing proposal
approved, the sample size is 45. In terms of deﬁning reﬁnancing audits, the point at which listed companies applied to the CSRC is not available, and we thus
use the interval between the approval of the reﬁnancing proposal at the shareholders’ meeting and the point at which the reﬁnancing quota was granted.
Table 6
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Sample size Mean Lower quartile Median Upper quartile Standard deviation
PUNISH 201 0.6468 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4792
ESCAPE 201 0.5423 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4995
OFFEND 201 0.7164 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4519
LOSS 201 0.5124 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5011
SOE 201 0.5721 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4960
PROTECT 201 0.0547 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2280
SOAR 201 0.4577 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4995
ROE 201 0.0467 0.0958 0.0260 0.1152 0.9641
LEV 210 0.7996 0.3705 0.6020 0.8245 0.7253
SIZE 201 20.3732 19.8679 20.3354 20.9155 0.9819
REGION 201 0.4776 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5007
Table 7
Correlation matrix.
PUNISH ESCAPE OFFEND LOSS SOE PROTECT SOAR ROE LEV SIZE REGION
PUNISH 1.0000 0.1359 0.4588 0.4661 0.2394 0.0052 0.0731 0.1102 0.2580 0.1095 0.0190
0.0545 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0006 0.9412 0.3026 0.1195 0.0002 0.1217 0.7892
ESCAPE 0.1359 1.0000 0.1974 0.2626 0.1541 0.0893 0.0222 0.0411 0.0351 0.0627 0.0812
0.0545 0.0050 0.0002 0.0289 0.2072 0.7540 0.5629 0.6207 0.3770 0.2521
OFFEND 0.4588 0.1974 1.0000 0.4242 0.0756 0.0058 0.0645 0.0856 0.0186 0.1219 0.1497
<0.0001 0.0050 <0.0001 0.2862 0.9349 0.3631 0.2269 0.7928 0.0846 0.0339
LOSS 0.4661 0.2626 0.4242 1.0000 0.0590 0.0159 0.1370 0.1435 0.3648 0.0021 0.0238
<0.0001 0.0002 <0.0001 0.4058 0.8228 0.0525 0.0421 <0.0001 0.9759 0.7374
SOE 0.2394 0.1541 0.0756 0.0590 1.0000 0.1197 0.1743 0.0511 0.1474 0.1263 0.0015
0.0006 0.0289 0.2862 0.4058 0.0907 0.0133 0.4710 0.0368 0.0739 0.9831
PROTECT 0.0052 0.0893 0.0058 0.0159 0.1197 1.0000 0.0863 0.0475 0.1644 0.1418 0.0987
0.9412 0.2072 0.9349 0.8228 0.0907 0.2233 0.5031 0.0197 0.0447 0.1633
SOAR 0.0731 0.0222 0.0645 0.1370 0.1743 0.0863 1.0000 0.0414 0.1044 0.0997 0.0412
0.3026 0.7540 0.3631 0.0525 0.0133 0.2233 0.5596 0.1403 0.1593 0.5616
ROE 0.0108 0.0592 0.0071 0.0466 0.0704 0.0822 0.0183 1.0000 0.0558 0.0688 0.0580
0.8793 0.4043 0.9198 0.5110 0.3207 0.2459 0.7964 0.4312 0.3319 0.4132
LEV 0.2138 0.0593 0.0370 0.2680 0.1715 0.1281 0.1178 0.1747 1.0000 0.0572 0.0938
0.0023 0.4032 0.6025 0.0001 0.0150 0.0701 0.0959 0.0131 0.4203 0.1853
SIZE 0.0506 0.0619 0.0833 0.0368 0.1687 0.1316 0.0574 0.0642 0.3439 1.0000 0.0604
0.4756 0.3824 0.2398 0.6041 0.0167 0.0625 0.4186 0.3653 <0.0001 0.3942
REGION 0.0190 0.0812 0.1497 0.0238 0.0015 0.0987 0.0412 0.0295 0.0891 0.0578 1.0000
0.7892 0.2521 0.0339 0.7374 0.9831 0.1633 0.5616 0.6774 0.2085 0.4151
Note: The lower triangular matrix shows Pearson correlation coefﬁcients; the upper triangular matrix shows Spearman correlation coefﬁcients.
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We now examine the enforcement efforts of the CSRC in terms of severity of punishment and efﬁciency of punishment.
We ﬁrst run a correlation analysis of all of the relevant variables, as shown in Table 7. Table 7 shows that severity of pun-
ishment (PUNISH) is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with non-compliance level (OFFEND) and investor losses (LOSS), but
signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with whether a company is an SOE (SOE), which are consistent with our theoretical pre-
dictions. The correlation matrix also shows that the correlation between non-compliance level (OFFEND) and investor losses
(LOSS) is 42.42%, suggesting that both may reﬂect the severity of company violations to some extent. There is no serious mul-
ti-collinearity between the other explanatory variables.4.2.1. Test of severity of punishment by the CSRC
To analyze the tendency of the CSRC to engage in selective enforcement when punishing companies committing viola-
tions, we use the following logistic regression model.1919 To
and thePUNISH ¼ a0 þ a1OFFENDþ a2LOSSþ a3SOEþ a4PROTECT þ a5SOARþ a6ROEþ a7LEV þ a8SIZEþ a9REGION
þ a10Y1þ a11Y2þ a12Y3þ a13Y4þ e ð1ÞThe regression test results are shown in Table 8. Column (1) shows that, when the other variables are not included, the
coefﬁcient for SOEs (SOE) is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that SOEs are likely to receive a lighter punishment. Columns
(2) and (3) show that when control variables are added, the higher the level of non-compliance (OFFEND) and investor lossescontrol for the inﬂuence of years (1994–2008, except 1995, a total of 14 years) and due to the small sample size, we take every three years as a period,
last two years as a period to obtain ﬁve periods in total, where Y1 (1997–2000), Y2 (2001–2003), Y3 (2004–2006) and Y4 (2007–2008).
Table 8
Test results for severity of punishment.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OFFEND 2.3979*** 2.4326***
(4.358) (4.337)
LOSS 1.9840*** 2.1322***
(4.128) (4.246)
SOE 1.0684*** 1.1610** 1.3250***
(3.334) (2.492) (2.859)
D1 1.5899** 2.2463***
(1.977) (2.691)
D2 1.0936** 1.1993**
(2.289) (2.517)
PROTECT 0.6695 0.4691 0.7719 0.6730
(0.683) (0.490) (0.762) (0.710)
SOAR 0.5299 1.1350** 0.4889 1.1180**
(0.943) (2.155) (0.856) (2.124)
ROE 0.1825 0.1073 0.1959 0.1402
(0.746) (0.416) (0.801) (0.539)
LEV 0.1752 0.4141 0.1832 0.4279
(0.436) (1.069) (0.458) (1.109)
SIZE 0.1197 0.1641 0.1531 0.2317
(0.482) (0.670) (0.602) (0.922)
REGION 0.5169 0.2805 0.5363 0.3308
(1.172) (0.660) (1.213) (0.769)
Y1 0.9094 1.2210 0.9259 1.2390
(0.993) (1.384) (1.004) (1.398)
Y2 0.3038 0.5186 0.3648 0.6153
(0.377) (0.682) (0.449) (0.797)
Y3 3.7550*** 3.9081*** 3.7741*** 3.9571***
(3.820) (4.055) (3.838) (4.074)
Y4 4.0828*** 4.6628*** 4.1552*** 4.8493***
(2.863) (3.305) (2.904) (3.377)
Constant 1.2603*** 4.4291 3.7865 5.2082 5.2886
(4.849) (0.871) (0.770) (0.994) (1.043)
Observations 201 201 201 201 201
Pseudo R2 0.0455 0.4415 0.4250 0.4432 0.4322
Note: The upper values are coefﬁcients and the lower values in parentheses are Wald values. For the Chi values in Column (4) where D1 = D2 equals 0.43, the
P value is 0.5108. For the Chi values in Column (5) where D1 = D2 equals 1.83, the P value is 0.1759.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
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ity of the violation. Having a state-owned background can signiﬁcantly reduce a company’s risk of suffering severe penalties
from the CSRC, and companies with no state-owned background receive more severe penalties. The market environment
(SOAR), the nature of the industry to which a company belongs (PROTECT), company performance (ROE), capital structure
(LEV), company size (SIZE) and the level of regional development (REGION) have no signiﬁcant affect on the severity of
the punishment. After 2001, the CSRC signiﬁcantly strengthened its law enforcement efforts. The test results indicate that
non-compliance after 2004 (Y3, Y4) was more likely to attract serious penalties, indicating time-based selective enforcement
by the CSRC.
To consider the effect of the level of SOEs on the severity of punishment, we further divide the SOEs into two groups com-
prising enterprises directly under the central government (D1) and enterprises under the control of local government (D2).
The test results are shown in Column (4) and Column (5) of Table 8, and suggest that the central SOEs are more likely to
escape severe penalties than private enterprises, and that the penalties that central SOEs receive are lighter.
4.2.2. Test of efﬁciency of punishment by the CSRC
To study the efﬁciency of punishment for non-compliance by the CSRC, we use the following logistic regression model.ESCAPE ¼ a0 þ a1OFFENDþ a2LOSSþ a3SOEþ a4PROTECT þ a5SOARþ a6ROEþ a7LEV þ a8SIZEþ a9REGION
þ a10Y1þ a11Y2þ a12Y3þ a13Y4þ e: ð2ÞThe regression test results are shown in Table 9. Column (1) shows that when the other variables are not included, the
coefﬁcient of SOE is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that SOEs escape punishment for longer. When the control variables
are added, the coefﬁcient for SOEs is still signiﬁcantly positive, again indicating that SOEs are more likely to escape penalties.
Column (2) and Column (3) show that under the same conditions, SOEs escape for longer. Even in a bull market (SOAR), the
Table 9
Test results for efﬁciency of punishment.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OFFEND 1.4217*** 1.4612***
(3.518) (3.502)
LOSS 1.8490*** 1.7402***
(4.628) (4.329)
SOE 0.6284** 0.6985** 0.6149*
(2.176) (2.165) (1.847)
D1 2.4646*** 1.9996**
(2.966) (2.449)
D2 0.4706 0.4323
(1.413) (1.267)
PROTECT 0.5524 0.2565 0.3378 0.1447
(0.730) (0.349) (0.448) (0.191)
SOAR 0.6311* 0.4328 0.6792* 0.4509
(1.811) (1.234) (1.887) (1.257)
ROE 0.1597 0.1865 0.1469 0.1733
(0.962) (1.063) (0.873) (0.985)
LEV 0.0515 0.3157 0.0267 0.3218
(0.197) (1.144) (0.101) (1.169)
SIZE 0.0860 0.1281 0.0391 0.0824
(0.485) (0.692) (0.214) (0.434)
REGION 0.2210 0.3705 0.2513 0.3925
(0.716) (1.165) (0.798) (1.218)
Y1 1.3245* 1.4421** 1.5554** 1.5015**
(1.806) (1.995) (2.078) (2.059)
Y2 0.3068 0.1618 0.5372 0.3135
(0.511) (0.281) (0.882) (0.542)
Y3 1.1381* 1.4039** 1.3201* 1.4420**
(1.683) (2.099) (1.918) (2.153)
Y4 1.1348 1.1016 1.3981* 1.2149
(1.466) (1.462) (1.761) (1.603)
Constant 0.1866 2.4382 2.6643 1.2983 1.5852
(0.861) (0.683) (0.716) (0.352) (0.414)
Observations 201 201 201 201 201
Pseudo R2 0.0173 0.0861 0.1287 0.1162 0.1465
Note: For the Chi values in Column (4) where D1 = D2 equals 5.96, the P value is 0.0146. For the Chi values in Column (5) where D1 = D2 equals 3.78, the P
value is 0.0517.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
Table 10
Correlation matrix for the variables on the consequences of selective enforcement by the CSRC.
APP OFFEND LOSS SOE PROTECT ROE LEV CR SIZE
APP 1.0000 0.1443 0.2159 0.0562 0.1000 0.3625 0.1546 0.0127 0.2070
0.1291 0.0223 0.5562 0.2944 <0.0001 0.1036 0.8945 0.0285
OFFEND 0.1443 1.0000 0.2549 0.0920 0.1597 0.0256 0.1429 0.2262 0.0818
0.1291 0.0067 0.3347 0.0926 0.7886 0.1328 0.0165 0.3913
LOSS 0.2159 0.2549 1.0000 0.0472 0.1297 0.0077 0.2691 0.2708 0.0485
0.0223 0.0067 0.6213 0.1728 0.9359 0.0041 0.0039 0.6117
SOE 0.0562 0.0920 0.0472 1.0000 0.0703 0.1533 0.0488 0.1471 0.3688
0.5562 0.3347 0.6213 0.4616 0.1067 0.6091 0.1218 <0.0001
PROTECT 0.1000 0.1597 0.1297 0.0703 1.0000 0.2515 0.1639 0.2596 0.2861
0.2944 0.0926 0.1728 0.4616 0.0075 0.0842 0.0057 0.0022
ROE 0.2493 0.0490 0.0348 0.0378 0.0574 1.0000 0.0480 0.0078 0.2950
0.0080 0.6076 0.7156 0.6920 0.5478 0.6153 0.9347 0.0016
LEV 0.2316 0.1482 0.3052 0.1388 0.0169 0.0884 1.0000 0.7111 0.0698
0.0140 0.1189 0.0011 0.1444 0.8594 0.3541 <0.0001 0.4644
CR 0.0833 0.0197 0.1625 0.0503 0.1590 0.0630 0.2965 1.0000 0.1467
0.3828 0.8367 0.0869 0.5985 0.0941 0.5096 0.0015 0.1228
SIZE 0.1906 0.0920 0.0303 0.4013 0.2980 0.0748 0.2413 0.0851 1.0000
0.0441 0.3345 0.7510 <0.0001 0.0014 0.4334 0.0104 0.3725
Note: The lower triangular matrix shows Pearson correlation coefﬁcients; the upper triangular matrix shows Spearman correlation coefﬁcients.
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time. The addition of the year variables show that after 2001, violating companies escaped for a shorter period of time, which
Table 11
Test results for reﬁnancing applications of violating companies.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
OFFEND 1.1436**
(2.065)
LOSS 0.5841
(1.109)
SOE 0.2323 0.6292 0.6257
(0.594) (1.182) (1.183)
PROTECT 0.1768 0.1014
(0.272) (0.165)
ROE 0.0647* 0.0610*
(1.888) (1.800)
LEV 0.0379** 0.0342*
(2.126) (1.907)
CR 0.3685 0.4334
(1.097) (1.162)
SIZE 0.3369 0.2328
(1.339) (0.978)
Constant 0.4947* 7.7208 4.7995
(1.950) (1.436) (0.952)
YEAR No Yes Yes
Observations 112 112 112
Pseudo R2 0.0023 0.2977 0.2768
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
Table 12
Test of approval for reﬁnancing of violating companies.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
OFFEND 1.0527
(0.876)
LOSS 0.1320
(0.114)
SOE 0.5596 0.8397 0.9559
(0.745) (0.694) (0.769)
PROTECT 0.1999 0.7886
(0.113) (0.439)
ROE 0.1491** 0.1406*
(1.964) (1.923)
LEV 0.0128 0.0261
(0.237) (0.443)
CR 0.2493 0.2086
(0.901) (0.771)
SIZE 1.4199** 1.1779**
(2.040) (1.954)
Constant 1.6582*** 35.4848** 29.1047**
(3.040) (2.147) (2.118)
YEAR No Yes Yes
Observations 45 45 45
Pseudo R2 0.0124 0.3791 0.3613
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
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ment efforts and improved its enforcement efﬁciency.
We again divided the SOEs into enterprises directly under the central government (D1) and enterprises under local gov-
ernment (D2). The test results are shown in Column (4) and Column (5) of Table 9. The results show that the SOEs, and espe-
cially the central SOEs, escaped penalties for a longer period of time. The relatively high status of central SOEs may create
obstacles to their supervision and punishment by the CSRC, and may result in a more negative attitude toward dealing with
their violations. This in turn could mean that a considerably longer time elapses before penalties are enforced. Of course, this
phenomenon may also be related to the generally lower quality of SOEs when they go public.
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The CSRC’s requirements for approval for reﬁnancing may give violating companies certain expectations. To test whether
companies committing light violations are more likely to apply for reﬁnancing, we use the following logistic regression
model.20 Thi
reﬁnan
continu
2005.6)
obtaine
reduceAPP ¼ a0 þ a1OFFENDþ a2LOSSþ a3SOEþ a4PROTECT þ a5ROEþ a6LEV þ a7CRþ a8SIZEþ
X
YEARþ e: ð3Þ
Here, APP is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company applied for reﬁnancing, and 0 otherwise. CR is the
current liquidity ratio of the company. Table 10 shows the correlation matrix for the variables, which indicates that whether
a company applied for reﬁnancing (APP) is negatively correlated with the non-compliance level (OFFEND), but positively cor-
related with investor losses (LOSS). The results require further regression analysis, which is shown in Table 11.
As Table 11 shows, the non-compliance level of listed companies (OFFEND) is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating a small
possibility of reﬁnancing for companies committing serious violations. The coefﬁcient for investor loss (LOSS) is insigniﬁcant.
In addition, the coefﬁcient for company performance (ROE) is signiﬁcantly negative,20 and companies with higher leverage
(LEV) are more inclined to apply for reﬁnancing. There are no signiﬁcant differences in the other control variables.
We further examine the effects of the possibility of obtaining a quota for companies applying for reﬁnancing, and present
the results in Table 12. The results indicate that the level of non-compliance does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the likelihood of
obtaining reﬁnancing approval.5. Conclusion
The selective enforcement of laws and regulations has become a hot topic in academia. This study uses instances of com-
panies being punished for violation behavior during the period 1994–2008 to analyze the characteristics of regulatory
enforcement by the CSRC, and in particular the selective enforcement of laws and regulations. The results show that the CSRC
pays special attention to the ownership of violating companies in its law enforcement. Companies with a state-owned back-
ground are more likely to escape serious punishment, and the higher the level of SOE, the lighter the punishment. However,
the larger the loss to investors caused by violations, the more serious the punishment meted out by the CSRC, as the CSRC
needs to reassure investors. We also ﬁnd that SOEs, and especially those directly under central government control, can es-
cape penalties imposed for violations for a longer period of time, which may be due to a lack of supervision of such compa-
nies by the CSRC. We also ﬁnd that selective enforcement may inﬂuence resource allocation in the securities market, with
companies committing light violations being more inclined to apply for reﬁnancing. We provide details of the two cases of
‘‘Hainan Kaili’’ and ‘‘Lukang Pharmaceutical’’ in an effort to understand the status, ability to control ﬁnancing resources and
investigative efﬁciency of the CSRC in enforcing the law. We ﬁnd that there is little doubt about the CSRC’s ability to control
ﬁnancing resources, but that although it has certain authority in enforcement, it lacks efﬁciency in investigating and punish-
ing companies suspected of violations, especially when the suspected companies have a state-owned background. It also fails
to be open and transparent, which may affect its ability to deter companies from committing violations. This study thus pro-
vides empirical evidence on and discusses the possible consequences of the nature of law enforcement in countries in eco-
nomic transition.
Its merits notwithstanding, this study has several limitations. First, the classiﬁcations for the severity of the violation and
the severity of the punishment are somewhat rough. Second, selective enforcement of the law may work as a possible alter-
native mechanism for law enforcement in transition economies, but we do not test its effectiveness in this sense. Third, the
sample of violating companies may be endogenous to some extent, which may have some impact on the conclusions. These
limitations should be addressed and resolved in future research.References
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